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Introduction 
Philosophical discussion of molecular and developmental biology began in the late 1960s 
with the use of genetics as a test case for models of theory reduction. With this exception, 
the theory of natural selection remained the main focus of philosophy of biology until the 
late 1970s. It was controversies in evolutionary theory over punctuated equilibrium and 
adaptationism that first led philosophers to examine the concept of developmental 
constraint. Developmental biology also gained in prominence in the 1980s as part of a 
broader interest in the new sciences of self-organization and complexity. The current 
literature in the philosophy of molecular and developmental biology has grown out of 
these earlier discussions under the influence of twenty years of rapid and exciting growth 
of empirical knowledge. Philosophers have examined the concepts of genetic information 
and genetic program, competing definitions of the gene itself and competing accounts of 
the role of the gene as a developmental cause. The debate over the relationship between 
development and evolution has been enriched by theories and results from the new field 
of  ‘evolutionary developmental biology’. Future developments seem likely to include an 
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exchange of ideas with the philosophy of psychology, where debates over the concept of 
innateness have created an interest in genetics and development. 
Review of Past Literature  
Reduction of Mendelian to Molecular Genetics 
According to the classical account of theory reduction, one theory reduces to another 
when the laws and generalizations of the first theory can be deduced from those of the 
second theory with the help of bridge principles relating the vocabularies of the two 
theories (Nagel 1961).  In 1967, Kenneth Schaffner suggested that classical Mendelian 
genetics could be reduced to the new, molecular genetics in something like this way. In a 
series of papers, Schaffner outlined his ‘general reduction model’ and argued for its 
applicability to the case of genetics (Schaffner 1967; Schaffner 1969). Despite the fact 
that Schaffner’s model of reduction was less demanding than the classical model and 
allowed considerable correction of the reduced theory to facilitate its deduction from the 
reducing theory, his proposal elicited considerable skepticism. David Hull argued that 
key terms in the vocabulary of Mendelian genetics – gene, locus, allele, dominance and 
so forth – have no unique correlate in molecular biology (Hull 1974). There is, for 
example, no single molecular mechanism corresponding to dominance. The phenotypic 
resemblance between heterozygote and dominant homozygote might be explained by the 
nature of the products of the two alleles, by gene regulation that compensates for the loss 
of one copy of an allele or by the existence of alternative pathways to the same outcome 
in morphogenesis. Definitions of dominance and other key Mendelian terms at the 
molecular level will be open-ended disjunctions of ways in which the Mendelian 
phenomena might be produced. Therefore, Hull and others argued, the generalizations of 
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classical genetics cannot be captured by statements at a similar level of generality in 
molecular biology. So the theory of classical genetics is irreducible to theories in 
molecular biology.  
 
The same fundamental issues were still under discussion ten years later, when Philip 
Kitcher put forward his ‘gory details’ argument (Kitcher 1984). Kitcher argued that 
classical, Mendelian genetics offers explanations of many important biological 
phenomena which are complete in their own terms and are not improved by adding the 
‘gory details’ at the molecular level. The Mendelian ratios, for example, are explained by 
the segregation and independent assortment of chromosomes. Any mechanism that 
obeyed these two laws would produce Mendelian ratios and so the details of how 
segregation and assortment are achieved, however important they are in their own right 
and as explanations of other facts, do not add anything to the explanation of Mendelian 
ratios. Kenneth C. Waters has rebutted this argument, arguing that classical genetic 
phenomena such as crossing-over in meiosis immediately raise questions that can only be 
addressed in a molecular framework, such as why recombination is more likely at certain 
points on the chromosomes. It is simply not plausible, Waters argues, to treat the 
relatively small number of exception-ridden generalizations identified by classical 
genetics as an explanatory framework that is complete in its own terms (Waters 1994a; 
Waters 1994b). Waters also proposes a definition of ‘gene’ designed to rebut the charge 
that Mendelian genes do not display a unity at the molecular level. A gene is any 
relatively short segment of DNA that functions as a biochemical unit (Waters 1994a: 
407). Waters admits that this definition makes the gene a unit of indeterminate length and 
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that it is the specific research context that determines whether a particular utterance of 
‘gene’ refers to a series of exons, an entire reading frame including both exons and 
introns, the reading frame plus adjacent regulatory regions or that complex plus other 
regions involved in regulating splicing and editing the transcript. Nevertheless, he argues, 
at the core of all these definitions of ‘gene’ is the basic concept of a sequence that is 
transcribed to produce a gene product. Other authors have argued that Waters’s definition 
creates a merely verbal unity between ‘genes’ with different structures, different 
functions and different theoretical roles in molecular biology (Neumann-Held 1998). The 
empirical facts that underlie this dispute are that reading sequences – the structural basis 
of the classical molecular conception of the gene - can be used to make a variety of 
products depending on the cellular context which regulates their expression and cuts, 
splices and edits the gene transcript. Reading sequences can also overlap one another. All 
these phenomena were unanticipated by early molecular biologists, let alone by pre-
molecular Mendelian geneticists. The magnitude of these theoretical developments in 
genetics makes it highly plausible that there have been changes in the concept of the 
gene, which is the central theoretical construct of that discipline. Whether such 
conceptual change would make reduction impossible is less clear. 
 
The thirty-year debate between reductionists and anti-reductionists has been complex and 
wide-ranging and numerous authors not mentioned here have made important 
contributions. A more adequate, but still brief, survey can be found in (Sterelny and 
Griffiths 1999: Ch 6-7) and an extended treatment in (Sarkar 1998). For many 
philosophers the main lesson of the debate is that traditional models of reduction do not 
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capture the important role played in scientific progress by successful explanations of 
larger systems in terms of their smaller constituents (Wimsatt 1976). Even committed 
reductionists such as Waters have adopted models of reduction very different from those 
with which the debate began. Schaffner himself has continued to make some of the most 
sophisticated contributions to the development of adequate models of the relationship 
between molecular biology and theories of larger units of biological organization. His 
work has increasingly focused on the role of model systems and results of limited 
generality derived from the analysis of these systems (Schaffner 1993).  
Developmental Constraints and Evolution 
It is generally accepted that the ‘modern synthesis’ of Mendelian genetics and natural 
selection that put so many of the biological sciences on a common theoretical basis failed 
to include the science of developmental biology (Hamburger 1980). The synthetic theory 
bypassed what were at the time intractable questions of the actual relationship between 
stretches of chromosome and phenotypic traits. Although it was accepted that genes must, 
in reality, generate phenotypic differences through interaction with other genes and other 
factors in development, genes were treated as ‘black boxes’ that could be relied on to 
produce the phenotypic variation with which they were known to correlate. The black-
boxing strategy allowed the two tractable projects – theoretical population genetics and 
the study of selection at the phenotypic level – to proceed. Selection could be studied at 
the phenotypic level on the assumption that variant phenotypes were generated in some 
unknown way by the genes and that phenotypic change would be tracked by change in 
gene frequencies. Population genetics, the mathematical core of the modern synthesis, 
could postulate genes corresponding to phenotypic differences and track the effect of 
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selection on these phenotypic variants at the genetic level. One effect of this strategy was 
to direct attention away from ideas that would obstruct these research practices. Amongst 
these inconvenient ideas was the view that development does not always permit the 
phenotypes that selection would favor. This idea was revived in the ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ theory of Niles Eldredge and Stephen J. Gould (Eldredge and Gould 1972; 
Gould and Eldredge 1977). Traditional neo-Darwinian gradualism suggests that species 
evolve more or less continuously in response to local selection pressures. The fossil 
record, on the other hand, suggests that species remain largely unaltered for long periods 
of time and occasionally undergo dramatic periods of rapid evolutionary change. The 
punctuated equilibrium theory proposed that the fossil record be read at face value, rather 
than in the light of the gradualist model of evolution.  The new theory needed an 
evolutionary explanation of this pattern and sought it in ‘developmental constraints’. The 
range of variant phenotypes produced by genetic changes is constrained by the nature of 
the organism’s developmental system so that selection is usually unable to produce 
dramatic reorganization of the phenotype. Conversely, a relatively small genetic change 
might, in the context of development as a whole, result in large phenotypic changes and 
very rapid evolution. Both possibilities can be understood using C. H Waddington’s 
metaphor of developmental canalization (Figure 1.). Most small perturbations to the 
course of development are compensated so that the organism arrives at the same 
destination. Some, however, send development down an entirely new ‘channel’.  
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Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
A second source of the renewed interest in developmental constraint was the debate over 
the limits of adaptive explanation. Stephen J. Gould and Richard Lewontin strongly 
criticized ‘adaptationism’ – the practice of seeking adaptive explanations for every 
feature of organisms. They suggested developmental constraint as one alternative 
explanation of biological form (Gould and Lewontin 1979). There are, for example, many 
viviparous snakes, but no viviparous turtles. Perhaps this is to be explained adaptively: 
any transitional form of turtle would be less fit that its fully oviparous competitors. The 
ease with which other groups, such as snakes and sharks, have evolved viviparous and 
quasi-viviparous species suggests an alternative explanation.  Perhaps the developmental 
biology of turtles means that no mutation produces the transitional forms. Gould and 
Lewontin also revived the traditional idea of the bauplan (body plan) or ‘unity of type’ of 
a whole group of organisms. Crustaceans, for example, have the segmented body of other 
arthropods but are distinguished from other clades by the fusion of the first five segments 
to form a head. It seems unlikely that this character has been a critical component of the 
fitness of every crustacean, from lobster to barnacle, but it has remained stable through 
long periods of evolution. Perhaps this is to be explained by developmental constraint – 
the head is part of the basic body plan of this kind of organism - a highly canalized 
outcome of crustacean development. 
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There is no doubt that developmental constraints exist (Maynard Smith, Burian et al. 
1985). A constraint can be defined fairly uncontentiously as a bias in the production of 
variation in a population. But there is little agreement about the evolutionary importance 
of constraints. Even more importantly for philosophy of biology, there is little agreement 
about how their importance might be measured. At one extreme, ‘process structuralists’ 
like Brian Goodwin have argued that explanation in terms of natural selection have only a 
marginal role when compared to explanations in terms of developmental constraint 
(Goodwin 1984; Ho and Saunders 1984). The process structuralists sought to revive the 
nineteenth century project of ‘rational taxonomy’: a classification of biological forms in 
terms of the generative principles by which form is constructed. The fact that an organism 
has a particular form is primarily explained by its place in this system. In support of their 
position, the process structuralists were able to offer striking examples of this kind of 
explanation. There are only a few patterns of phylotaxis – the successive arrangement of 
radial parts in a growing plant – and these patterns are typically conserved within 
lineages of plant species. A general mathematical description of these patterns is 
available and models of growth that obey this mathematical description are biologically 
plausible (Mitchison 1977). If correct, this is an impressively general explanation of 
many biological traits in many species. The process structuralists also presented 
methodological arguments. Scientific explanations should appeal to laws of nature, not 
historical accidents. Explanations of form in terms of the mechanisms of growth are 
simply better explanations than those that rely on natural selection (Goodwin and 
Webster 1996). Most developmentalists have been less extreme than the process 
structuralists. They do not deny the importance of natural selection, but insist that the 
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course of evolution cannot be understood in terms of selection alone, only in terms of the 
interaction of selection with the constraints imposed on phenotypic change by 
development.  At the other extreme, some biologists have argued that constraints can only 
ever be temporary, since evolution can reconstruct the developmental system of the 
organism so as to achieve whatever outcome is selectively optimal. Darwin himself 
expressed something like this sentiment when he remarked that his theory embraced both 
traditional forms of biological explanation, the ‘unity of type’ and the ‘conditions of 
existence’, but that the conditions of existence was the ‘higher law’ because it explains 
the origin of the types (Darwin 1964: 206). But there are many highly conserved features 
of biological lineages that are not plausibly explained by stabilizing selection, such as the 
fused head-segments of crustaceans mentioned above or the relative position of bones in 
the tetrapod limb. Something must explain the fact that these features have not been 
affected by random genetic drift and developmental constraint is an obvious candidate.   
William Wimsatt has offered a highly general argument for the view that developmental 
constraints will be harder for selection to remove than to construct (Wimsatt 1986; 
Wimsatt 1999). It is widely accepted that the ability of natural selection to create complex 
adaptation depends on the ability to create those adaptations cumulatively, adding 
features one at a time. Wimsatt argues that new adaptations will be constructed by 
utilizing existing developmental structures in the organism, so that the ability to develop 
the new feature is left dependent on the continued existence of the older features. 
Wimsatt calls this process ‘developmental entrenchment’ and argues that it will lead to 
features of the organism becoming progressively less open to selective modification in 
their own right as additional features are built ‘on top’. 
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Another argument for the adaptationist perspective concedes the role of development as a 
cause of form, but questions its value as an explanation of form. One of the primary aims 
of biology is to explain the fact that organisms are well adapted for their conditions of life 
(Dawkins 1986; Dennett 1995). Naturally, there is a developmental explanation of how 
each organism is constructed, but this cannot explain the fact that organisms are well 
adapted. How could the developmental structure of organisms ensure in and of itself that 
organisms are well suited to the demands of their environment?  
‘Of course, large quantities of evolutionary change may be non-adaptive, in which 
case these alternative theories may well be important in parts of evolution, but only 
in the boring parts of evolution, not the parts concerned with what is special about 
life as opposed to non-life.’ (Dawkins 1986: 303. Some process structuralist targets 
of this remark are identified by name on 307.) 
 Peter Godfrey-Smith has christened this view ‘explanatory adaptationism’ to distinguish 
it from the ‘empirical adaptationist’ view that almost every feature of organisms has an 
adaptive explanation (Godfrey-Smith 1999). For the explanatory adaptationist, the 
problem with developmental explanations is not that they are false, but that they explain 
the wrong thing. 
  
Ronald Amundson has argued that adaptationists and developmentalists are to a 
significant extent talking past one another because they have very different concepts of 
developmental constraint (Amundson 1994). In developmental biology, a developmental 
constraint explains why certain phenotypes do not occur, either generally or in some 
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particular group of organisms. The fact that a feature conforms to a developmental 
constraint in this sense is consistent with it being perfectly adapted to its environment.  In 
the study of adaptation, however, developmental constraints are postulated to explain 
why organisms are unable to construct the optimally adaptive phenotype. This, second 
understanding of constraint is manifested in another of Godfrey-Smith’s categories: 
‘methodological adaptationism’. This is view that the best way to reveal developmental 
constraints is to build optimality models and look at how nature deviates from what is 
optimally adaptive. In this sense, constraint and adaptation are opposed to one another by 
definition. Like Godfrey-Smith’s distinction between empirical and explanatory 
adaptationism, Amumdson’s distinction between constraints on form and constraints on 
adaptation goes some way to explain why the debate between adaptationists and 
developmentalists has produced more heat than light. But even after these conceptual 
clarifications, there remain genuine empirical differences between the two views, as 
Amundson himself makes clear. The underlying empirical issue is how much of the space 
of possible biological forms (‘morphospace’) is ruled out by the fact that organisms built 
using the fundamental techniques shared by the earth’s biota cannot develop in that way. 
One way to represent this disagreement is by different predictions about what would 
happen to a population of organisms in the absence of selection. The adaptationist ‘null 
hypothesis’ is that random variation would spread the population evenly through an 
increasingly large region of morphospace. The developmentalist ‘null hypothesis’ is that 
even without selection organisms would be found clustered in some regions of 
morphospace and excluded from others because of developmental constraints on the 
production of variants (Alberch 1982). Developing this theme, Paul Griffiths has argued 
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that what appear to be conceptual or methodological differences between process 
structuralists and extreme adaptationists may in reality be manifestations of this empirical 
disagreement (Griffiths 1996). The empirical disagreement produces conflicting 
intuitions about whether development or natural selection is more explanatory because a 
request for explanation presumes a contrast between the state of affairs to be explained 
and other possible states of affairs (Van Fraassen 1977). The question ‘why is this 
organism here in morphospace?’ implies the contrast ‘as opposed to some other region of 
morphospace’. Because process structuralists think most regions of morphospace are 
developmentally impossible they will see an explanation of how the organism develops 
its actual form as highly explanatory. By explaining how this form is possible it contrasts 
it with the forms that are impossible. The adaptationist assumes that almost all forms are 
developmentally possible, so learning that the actual form is possible does not explain the 
contrast between this form and the adjacent forms.  
 
Biocomplexity and Self-organisation 
Support for the idea that selection is not the only factor determining biological form was 
provided in the 1990s by the new sciences of complexity (Burian and Richardson 1990; 
Bechtel and Richardson 1993). Some complex systems possess an intrinsic tendency to 
occupy highly ordered states, so selection is not the only possible source of order in 
living systems (see also Riedl 1977). Stuart Kauffman’s simulations of networks of 
‘genetic’ elements suggested that basic biological phenomena such as autocatalytic cycles 
required for the origin of life or the array of cell-types required for the emergence of 
multi-cellular life are highly probable outcomes of random variation in complex chemical 
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or, later, genetic networks (Kauffman 1993). This is in striking contrast to the traditional 
view that such complex outcomes are highly improbable and must be explained by 
cumulative selection of many, much smaller increases in order. Kauffman’s simulations 
also suggested that selection is relatively ineffective when the ‘genetic’ elements are 
strongly interconnected so that the activity of one depends on that of many others, 
something that is probably true of actual genes. Because Kauffman’s work suggests that 
order may be generated without selection, and that selection may not be able to overcome 
the intrinsic tendencies of systems, he has sometimes been seen as providing support for 
the process structuralist position (Goodwin, Kauffman et al. 1993). But other elements of 
Kauffman’s work do not lend themselves to this interpretation. Self-organisation and 
selection can reinforce one another: self-organisation can enrich the input to selection and 
selection can ‘tune’ developmental parameters to encourage the production of complex 
variants (Depew and Weber 1995). In recent years even highly adaptationist authors such 
as Daniel Dennett have made use of Kauffman’s work (Dennett 1995). 
Current status of Problems 
Genetic Information 
There is an ‘interactionist consensus’ in the life sciences that all traits are dependent on 
both genetic and environmental factors in development (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999: 13-
17). The consensus emerged from early twentieth-century critiques of the concept of 
instinct and from parallel critiques of the concept of innateness in early ethology. But this 
is consistent with the view that genes cause development in a radically different way 
from other, ‘environmental’ factors. Genes are widely believed to contain a program that 
guides development and to contain information about the evolved traits of the organism.  
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Despite the ubiquity of talk of genetic information in molecular and developmental 
biology, the predominant view in recent philosophical work on this topic has been that 
‘genetic information’ and ‘genetic program’ have a precise meaning only in the context 
of the relationship between DNA sequence, RNA sequence and protein structure (Sarkar 
1996; Griffiths and Knight 1998; Godfrey-Smith 1999; Kitcher In Press). In their broader 
applications these ideas are merely picturesque ways to talk about correlation and 
causation. 
 
The obvious way to explicate information talk in biology is via information theory. 
Information in this sense is the systematic dependence of a signal on a source, a 
dependence that is created by a set of channel conditions.  In the case of development, the 
genes are normally taken to be the source, the life-cycle of the organism is the signal and 
the channel conditions are all the other resources needed for the life-cycle to unfold.  But 
it is a fundamental feature of information theory that the role of source and channel 
condition can be reversed. A source/channel distinction is imposed on a causal system by 
an observer. The source is one channel condition whose current state the signal is being 
used to investigate.  If all other resources are held constant, a life-cycle can give us 
information about the genes, but if the genes are held constant, a life-cycle can give us 
information about whichever other resource we decided to let vary. So far as causal 
information goes, every resource whose state affects development is a source of 
developmental information (Johnston 1987; Gray 1992; Griffiths and Gray 1994; Oyama 
2000a). 
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The fact that causal information conforms to this ‘parity thesis’ is now quite widely 
recognized (Godfrey-Smith 1999; Sterelny and Griffiths 1999; Maynard Smith 2000; 
Kitcher In Press). A common response has been to analyze genetic information using 
teleosemantics, the philosophical program of reducing meaning to biological function 
(teleology) and then reducing biological function to natural selection (Millikan 1984; 
Papineau 1987). In his version of the teleosemantic approach, John Maynard Smith 
compares natural selection to computer programming using the 'genetic algorithm' 
technique. The genetic algorithm programmer randomly varies the code of a computer 
program and selects variants for their performance. In the same way, natural selection 
randomly varies the genes of organisms and selects those organisms for their fitness. Just 
as the function of the selected computer program is to perform the task for which it was 
selected, the biological function of successful genes is to produce the developmental 
outcomes in virtue of which they were selected. Such genes are intentionally directed 
onto, or about, those effects. The defective haemoglobin gene in some human 
populations, which has been selected because it sometimes confers resistance to malaria, 
carries teleosemantic information about malaria resistance. However, teleosemantic 
information is fundamentally unsuited to the aim of avoiding parity. The most fully 
developed teleosemantic account of developmental information is the 'extended replicator 
theory' (Sterelny, Dickison et al. 1996; Sterelny 2000), which recognizes from the outset 
that teleosemantic information exists in both genetic and in some non-genetic 
developmental causes. Griffiths and Russell Gray argue that teleosemantic information 
exists in an much wider range of developmental causes (Griffiths and Gray 1997). 
Teleosemantic information exists in any inheritance system that is a product of evolution, 
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including epigenetic inheritance systems. The term 'epigenetic inheritance system' is used 
to denote biological mechanisms which produces resemblances between parents and 
offspring and which works in parallel with the inheritance of nuclear and mitochondrial 
DNA (Jablonka and Szathmáry 1995). Every organism inherits a great deal besides its 
DNA. To develop normally the egg cell must contain features such as: basal bodies and 
microtubule organising centres, correct cytoplasmic chemical gradients, DNA 
methylation patterns, membranes and organelles, as well as DNA. Changes in these other 
resources can cause heritable variation that appears in all the cells descended from that 
egg cell. Differences in methylation, for example, are important in tissue differentiation 
during the lifetime of a single organism, but they can also pass between the generations. 
Methylation patterns are often applied to the DNA in a sperm or egg by the parent 
organism. DNA methylation inheritance has excited a great deal of interest because of it 
is easy to see how it could play a role in conventional, micro-evolutionary change. Wider 
forms of epigenetic inheritance include the inheritance of symbiotic microorganisms, 
habitat and host imprinting, and the care of offspring. All these mechanisms are 
candidates for evolutionary explanation - they did not come about by accident. This 
means that the physical traces by which these inheritance mechanisms influence the next 
generation have biological functions and thus, on the teleosemantic approach, that these 
traces contain information. The widest form of epigenetic inheritance is  'niche 
construction’. Many features of an organism's niche exist only because of the effects of 
previous generations of that species on the local environment (Laland, Odling-Smee et al. 
2001). However, despite the evolutionary importance of niche construction, the 
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collectively constructed features of a species' niche are not adaptations of the individual 
organism, and hence probably cannot be assigned teleosemantic information content.  
Genetic Program 
 
The concept of the genetic program has proved as controversial as that of genetic 
information (Keller 1995). Its critics have questioned whether development is more 
program-like than any other law governed physical process. There is a sense in which the 
planets compute their courses around the sun, integrating the forces that act on them to 
determine the trajectory they will follow. If the idea of a genetic program comes to no 
more than this, then it is of little scientific value. Some historians of molecular biology 
have argued that the history of the genetic program concept in molecular biology is one 
of retreat from literal hypothesis to guiding metaphor to mere tool for popularization 
(Chadarevian (1998) see also Sarkar (1996)).  In contrast, Alexander Rosenberg has 
defended the view that the study of development is the study of how the embryo is 
‘computed’ from the genes and proteins contained in the egg cell (Rosenberg 1997). 
Rosenberg’s argument is that striking recent successes in developmental molecular 
biology have concerned genes which switch other genes on or off in hierarchical cascades 
of gene activation. What, he asks, could be a more powerful vindication of the idea that 
the genes contain a self-executing program for development?  Evelyn Fox-Keller has 
rejected this interpretation of the science, arguing that gene activation in the developing 
embryo is precisely not like the unfolding of a stored program, but instead like distributed 
computing, in which processes are reliably executed by local interactions in networks of 
simple elements (Keller 1999). The mathematician Henri Atlan adds another perspective 
to this debate, arguing that if there is a program for development in any sense analogous 
The Philosophy of Molecular and Developmental Biology 18 
to programs in computer science, then the program is not in the genome. Atlan argues 
that a rigorous deployment of the analogy identifies DNA sequences with the data 
accessed at various times whilst a program is running. The program itself is running on 
the cellular mechanisms that transcribe and process DNA (Atlan and Koppel 1990). 
Developmental Systems Theory 
 
Developmental systems theory (DST) is an alternative account of the relationship 
between genes and other factors in development. It has its roots in a longstanding 
tradition of dissatisfaction with the concepts of instinct, innateness, genetic information 
and genetic program amongst workers in comparative psychology and developmental 
psychobiology (Gottlieb In Press). When used with care, ideas of instinct, innateness, 
genetic program and genetic information constitute a kind of ‘methodological 
preformationism’ in which biological form is treated as if it was transmitted intact to the 
next generation so as to avoid the need to deal with the complexities of development. 
Very often, however, these concepts are treated as if they were substantial explanatory 
constructs, leading to the illusion that no developmental explanation is needed for traits 
that are ‘innate’, ‘hardwired’ or ‘in the genes’! In place of these ideas, DST argues for a 
thorough-going epigenetic account of development. Biological form is not transmitted 
intact, or as an intact representation of that form, but must be reconstructed in each 
generation by interaction between physical causes. Moreover, there is no one element that 
controls development or prefigures its outcomes. The term ‘developmental system’ refers 
to the system of physical resources that interact to produce the life cycle of a particular 
evolving lineage. A lineage is redefined as a causally connected sequence of similar 
individual life cycles and inheritance is redefined as the reliable reproduction of 
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developmental resources down lineages. This definition includes all the mechanisms of 
epigenetic inheritance, as well as niche construction and the mere reliable persistence of 
features upon which the developmental system can draw. Natural selection becomes the 
differential reproduction of heritable variants of developmental systems due to relative 
improvements in their functioning, a process which leads to change over time in the 
composition of populations of developmental systems (Griffiths and Gray In Press).  
 
The book that drew the developmental systems tradition together and gave it a definitive 
name was Susan Oyama’s The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and 
Evolution (Oyama 2000a), first published in 1985 at around the same time as several of 
Oyama’s important papers (Oyama 2000b). Philosophers of biology began to discuss 
these new ideas in the 1990s, some aiming to develop and extend Oyama’s approach 
(Moss 1992; Griffiths and Gray 1994) (Griffiths and Gray 1997) and others to critically 
evaluate it. Cor van der Weele has argued that the criticisms of contemporary neo-
Darwinism offered by DST are almost completely orthogonal to those of the process 
structuralists (Van der Weele 1999). DST could potentially treat developmental resources 
atomistically and rely on selection as the primary explanation of biological form. In 
reality, however, most DST authors have been sympathetic to the idea that developmental 
constraints and emergent developmental organization are real and play a role in 
evolution. Kim Sterelny and others have accepted some of the critical points made by 
DST, but argued that these do not justify abandoning the replicator in favor of the 
developmental system as the unit of evolution (Sterelny, Dickison et al. 1996). Epigenetic 
inheritance can be accommodated by enlarging the cast of replicators to include some 
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inherited non-genes. The fact that replicators require a specific context in order to exert 
the causal influence can be handled in a manner similar to earlier critiques of the 
dependence of single genes on their genetic contexts (Sterelny and Kitcher 1988). 
Schaffner has argued that most work in molecular developmental biology conforms to the 
strictures about the distributed control of development and the context-sensitivity of 
genetic and other causes. He also argues that a certain instrumental privileging of genetic 
causes is a justifiable part of research practice (Schaffner 1998). 
 
The most thorough presentation of DST and its application to date is (Oyama, Griffiths et 
al. 2001), a volume that also contains critical contributions by some of the authors 
mentioned here. 
Analyses of Gene Concept 
Controversies about the role of genes in development in evolution have generated 
controversies about the definition of the gene. These have not been sterile debates over 
the ‘right’ definition. The debates have concerned how genes are actually defined by 
various kinds of biologist, what this indicates about their thinking and whether genes so 
defined can bear the theoretical weight placed upon them. An excellent introduction to 
recent debates over the concept of the gene is (Beurton, Falk et al. 2000). There has been 
a great deal of criticism of the evolutionary gene concept of George C. Williams 
according to which a gene is any sequence of DNA ‘which segregates and recombines 
with appreciable ‘ (Williams 1966: 24). Many authors in the philosophy of evolutionary 
biology have discussed whether change over time in populations of evolutionary genes 
can explain change at the phenotypic level (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999: 77-93). In the 
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philosophy of developmental and molecular biology, however, the central issue has been 
the relationship between genes and phenotypes. The classical molecular gene concept, 
which emerged in the 1960s and is still orthodox in textbook presentations of genetics 
defines a gene as a stretch of DNA that expresses a particular polypeptide via 
transcription and translation. This identifies an individual gene by a particular, minimal 
‘phenotype’ to which it gives rise. As mentioned above, Waters still defends something 
close to this concept of the gene as both central to and adequate for the practice of 
molecular biology and his account has been criticized by Eva Neumann-Held (Waters 
1994; Neumann-Held 1998). Griffiths and Neumann-Held have argued that the 
development of gene concepts from the turn of the century to the present day has been 
driven by the twin desires to find a structural unit in the DNA itself and to have that unit 
make some constant contribution to development (Griffiths and Neumann-Held 1999). 
They argue that current knowledge about the multiple functions of many genes makes 
this difficult if not impossible and suggest (but do not endorse) identifying a sequence of 
DNA with a unique norm of reaction of gene products across cellular contexts. Their own 
proposal is to identify a specific gene with a DNA sequence plus the context needed to 
pin down a single gene product in the manner of the classical molecular concept.   
 
Other authors have argued that two distinct notions of gene play a role in molecular 
biology: ‘structural’ genes that code for polypeptides used to make structural proteins and 
‘regulatory’ or ‘developmental’ genes are involved in developmental signaling (Morange 
2000). The most famous examples of developmental genes are the homeobox genes – 
highly conserved sequences that are involved in segmentation in arthropods and in 
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forming the axes of the vertebrate embryo. Developmental genes have become the 
favored example of both the friends and enemies of the genetic program concept (Gilbert 
2000). Those critical of the concept take the facts about developmental genes to show that 
the same sequence can have a radically different effect in a different context. Advocates 
of the program concept are impressed by how much of the developmental process can be 
‘controlled’ by a few genes.  
 
Lenny Moss has criticized both Waters’ analysis and the analysis of Neumann-Held and 
Griffiths and argued that the very same genes are both multi-potential in the manner of 
the ‘developmental gene’ and, in another context, defined by a determinate phenotypic 
effect (Moss 2001; Moss In Press). Moss proposes that the whole range of uses of the 
gene concept in contemporary biology can be reduced to two competing 
conceptualizations of the gene that, he argues, were implicit from the earliest days of 
genetics. The first way of conceiving of a gene, which Moss calls ‘Gene-P’, is a 
manifestation of the instrumental preformationist research strategy discussed above. In 
research contexts in which scientists are interested in establishing or exploiting gene-
phene correlations it makes sense to treat genes as if as if they were defined by their 
association with a certain phenotypic outcome. Blue eyes occur if a gene involved in the 
synthesis of the brown protein is damaged in some way. What makes a DNA sequence a 
gene for blue eyes is not any particular sequence nor any knowledge of the 
developmental pathway that leads to blue eyes but only the fact that the presence of this 
gene can be used to predict blue eyes. That example comes from classical Mendelian 
genetics, but contemporary molecular genetics also makes use of the Gene-P concept. 
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BRCA1, the gene for breast cancer, is treated as a Gene-P. Moss’s other gene concept 
(Gene-D) is defined by its molecular sequence. Gene-D is a developmental resource that 
can make any of a multitude of different contributions to development in different 
contexts. Moss uses the example of the N-CAM gene, the gene that produces the so-
called ‘neural cell adhesion molecule’. The N-CAM gene is a specific nucleic acid 
sequences from which any of 100 different isoforms of the N-CAM protein may 
potentially be derived. This protein is expressed in different tissues at different 
developmental stages in many different forms.  
“So where a Gene-P is defined strictly on the basis of its instrumental utility in 
predicting a phenotypic outcome and is most often based upon the absence of 
some normal sequence, a Gene-D is a specific developmental resource, defined by 
its specific molecular sequence and thereby functional template capacity and yet it 
is indeterminate with respect to ultimate phenotypic outcomes.” (Moss 2001: xxx) 
Moss argues that many uses of molecular findings that have been criticized by, for 
example, the developmental systems theory, arise from taking findings that make sense 
using the Gene-D concept and interpreting them as if they involved the Gene-P concept. 
For example, Moss would see it as inappropriate to describe one of the classical 
developmental genes – sequences used in the control of gene expression in many parts of 
many distantly related species – as a ‘gene for’ the large section of the phenotype of one 
of those species in whose development it is implicated.  
Evolutionary Developmental Biology 
One of the most exciting trends in recent biology has been the emergence of 
‘evolutionary developmental biology’ – the integrated study of evolution and 
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development (Raff and Raff 1987; Hall 1992; Raff 1996). Evolutionary developmental 
biology simultaneously explores the impact of development on the evolutionary process 
and the evolution of development. A common philosophical interpretation of this trend in 
biology is that the ‘molecular revolution’ has ‘opened the black box’ created as part of 
the modern synthesis. What were previously two kinds of empirical work that led to very 
different and conflicting pictures of life – evolutionary genetics and developmental 
biology - can now be empirically integrated so as to yield a single picture (Burian 1997). 
Waddington’s notion of developmental canalization, for example, has been interpreted as 
the result of the ubiquity of negative and positive feedback loops in the regulation of gene 
expression (Freeman 2000). The developmental concept of a ‘morphogenetic field’ has 
been reinterpreted as an emergent phenomena resulting from gene regulation (Gilbert, 
Opitz et al. 1996).  
 
A central issue in the older debate between developmentalists and adaptationists was the 
extent to which phenotypes are holistic entities in which change in one part affects every 
other. Part of Gould and Lewontin’s critique of adaptationism was that it assumes an 
implausibly atomistic phenotype. Many traits of organisms, they argued, cannot be 
optimized by selection because they are developmentally linked to other traits. In reply, 
adaptationists accused their critics of having an implausibly holistic conception of the 
phenotype. After all, the documented examples of natural selection, to say nothing of 
artificial selection, demonstrate that many traits can be altered without causing any 
dramatic reorganization of the phenotype. The argument, mentioned above, that 
developmental constraints are created by evolution and can therefore be dissolved by 
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evolution was also used to support the adaptationist position. Work in developmental 
evolutionary biology has helped to make this debate more tractable and progressive. A 
key concept in evolutionary developmental biology is ‘developmental modularity’. A 
developmental module is a set of developmental processes that strongly interact with one 
another and interact only weakly with processes outside the module (Müller and Wagner 
1991). Modules can be the result of the same pattern of connectivity holding within the 
genome, so that the developmental module corresponds to a ‘genetic module’. 
Alternatively, developmental modularity can be an emergent phenomena resulting, for 
example, from the emergence of physical boundaries in the embryo. Existing knowledge 
in developmental molecular biology strongly suggests that development is modular and 
models of the evolution of development suggest that selection will favor the emergence 
of modularity (Wagner, Booth et al. 1997).  
  
The concept of developmental modularity can be used to reexamine some of the older 
issues concerning developmental constraints.  Developmental modules represent a natural 
partition of the phenotype in units whose evolution can proceed relatively independently. 
An accurate model of evolutionary dynamics must incorporate the fact that the evolving 
phenotype is neither atomistic nor holistic, but modular. It is far from obvious that this 
fact should be interpreted as showing the importance of what Amundson has termed 
‘constraints on adaptation’ (Amundson 1994). If developmental modules are the real 
biological characters of which organisms are composed then saying that selectionnis 
constrained by having to act on modules is nearly as odd as saying that it is constrained 
by having to act on features of the phenotype. Philosophers of biology are starting to 
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rethink issues in evolutionary theory in terms of the modularity concept and the results 
promise to be of the highest interest (Brandon 1999). 
Future Work 
The debate over the role of information concepts in biology is in full swing at present and 
likely to continue. The renewed contact between the philosophies of evolutionary and 
developmental biology is also likely to occupy many writers for some time to come. One 
developmental concept that seems likely to be revisited after some years of neglect is that 
of innateness. In developmental biology ‘innateness’ seems as charmingly old-fashioned 
a theoretical construct as ‘instinct’ and equally peripheral to any actual account of gene 
regulation or morphogenesis. In behavioral ecology some authors regard the innateness 
concept as irretrievably confused and a term that all serious scientific workers should 
eschew (Bateson 1991) whilst others claim that the popular demand to know if something 
is ‘in our genes’ is best construed as a question about whether a trait is an adaptation 
(Symons 1992: 141).  In cognitive psychology, however, whether a trait is innate in its 
traditional sense – coming in some sense from ‘inside’ rather than the ‘outside’ - is still a 
key question, and the subject of heated debate (Cowie 1999). Some philosophers of 
biology have tried to bring work in developmental biology to bear on the psychological 
debate (Ariew 1999) and judging by recent conference presentations more work of this 
kind can be expected.  
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Figure 1. Canalisation of development. The development of the organism is represented 
by the trajectory of the ball when it is releases and the developmental structure of the 
organism by the surface. Mutations alter the height of points on this surface, generally 
with little effect on the trajectory of the ball, but occasionally with dramatic effect 
(Waddington 1957: 36). 
 
